Corpus ID: 237494684

Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility

@article{Atay2021MatchingMW,
  title={Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility},
  author={Ata Atay and Eric Bahel and Tam{\'a}s Solymosi},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2021},
  volume={abs/2109.05456}
}
This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer-seller pair may either trade directly or use the services of a middleman; and a middleman may serve multiple buyer-seller pairs. Direct trade between a buyer and a seller is costlier than a trade mediated by a middleman. For each such market, we examine an associated cooperative game with transferable utility. First, we show that an optimal matching for a matching market with middlemen can be obtained by… Expand

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TLDR
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