Corpus ID: 1777865

Matching Games with Additive Externalities

@article{Brnzei2012MatchingGW,
  title={Matching Games with Additive Externalities},
  author={Simina Br{\^a}nzei and Tomasz P. Michalak and Talal Rahwan and K. Larson and N. Jennings},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2012},
  volume={abs/1207.3682}
}
Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents make. Such an influence is called an externality. Whereas fully expressive representations of externalities in matchings require exponential space, in this paper we propose a compact model of externalities, in which the influence of a match on each agent is… Expand
4 Citations

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