Mary Mary, Quite Contrary

@article{Graham2000MaryMQ,
  title={Mary Mary, Quite Contrary},
  author={G. Graham and T. Horgan},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2000},
  volume={99},
  pages={59-87}
}
L'A. se propose de reviser l'experience de pensee de Mary, appelee argument de la connaissance, developpee par F. Jackson contre les theories materialistes et physicalistes de la conscience phenomenale. Examinant l'environnement epistemique noir-et-blanc de Mary, l'A. montre que l'argument anti-materialiste s'apparente a la theorie du contenu intentionnel non-conceptuel, abstrait et equilibre, definie par M. Tye. 
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