Corpus ID: 46554976

Marriage Market Transfers of Resources and Property Rights ∗ [ Preliminary ]

  title={Marriage Market Transfers of Resources and Property Rights ∗ [ Preliminary ]},
  author={S. Anderson and Chris Bidner},
  • S. Anderson, Chris Bidner
  • Published 2010
  • We analyze the nature of marriage market transfers (dowry) by developing a simple competitive model of the marriage market in which bridal families decide how much to transfer to their daughter and how much to transfer to a potential groom. By allocating property rights over total marital transfers in this way, the bridal family influences the outcome of household bargaining. This approach connects two seemingly unrelated roles for dowries identified in the literature; as a pre-mortem… CONTINUE READING

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