Marriage Market , Divorce Legislation , and Household Labor Supply

@inproceedings{Chiappori2002MarriageM,
  title={Marriage Market , Divorce Legislation , and Household Labor Supply},
  author={Pierre-Andre Chiappori and Bernard Fortin and Guy Lacroix},
  year={2002}
}
This paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply. In our approach, the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of “distribution factors.” These factors are defined as variables that affect the household members’ bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set. We extend the collective labor supply model developed by Chiappori to allow for… CONTINUE READING
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