• Corpus ID: 244073925

Marriage, marital investments, and divorce: Theory and evidence on policy non neutrality

@inproceedings{Reynoso2019MarriageMI,
  title={Marriage, marital investments, and divorce: Theory and evidence on policy non neutrality},
  author={Ana Teresa Fari{\~n}a Reynoso},
  year={2019}
}
In the traditional marriage market literature, policies affecting partners’ property rights do not affect who marries whom. In this paper I build a theory that shows that this neutrality result breaks down if we consider marital investments which returns are unverifiable to courts and accumulate in the private account of one of the spouses. I develop an equilibrium model of marriage, household specialization, and divorce in which working spouses with stay-at-home partners accumulate relatively… 
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