Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities

@inproceedings{Curtat1996MarkovEO,
  title={Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities},
  author={Laurent O. Curtat},
  year={1996}
}
Abstract The existence of Markov equilibria for stochastic games with a continuum of states is a complex issue for which no general result holds as yet. In this article, the problem is solved for a class of stochastic games that satisfy assumptions of complementarity and monotonicity. The proof of existence relies on results from lattice programming. In the Markov equilibria singled out by the Theorem of Existence, the policies and continuation values are increasing and Lipschitz continuous… CONTINUE READING

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