Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing

@inproceedings{Jalota2020MarketsFE,
  title={Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing},
  author={Devansh Jalota and M. Pavone and Qi Qi and Y. Ye},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2020}
}
Public goods are often either over-consumed in the absence of regulatory mechanisms, or remain completely unused, as in the Covid-19 pandemic, where social distance constraints are enforced to limit the number of people who can share public spaces. In this work, we plug this gap through market based mechanisms designed to efficiently allocate capacity constrained public goods. To design these mechanisms, we leverage the theory of Fisher markets, wherein each agent in the economy is endowed with… Expand

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 27 REFERENCES
Near-Efficient Allocation Using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Budget-Additive Valuations
Spending Constraint Utilities with Applications to the Adwords Market
  • V. Vazirani
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Math. Oper. Res.
  • 2010
The combinatorial assignment problem: approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
Earning Limits in Fisher Markets with Spending-Constraint Utilities
New Convex Programs for Fisher's Market Model and its Generalizations
EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
Distributed algorithms via gradient descent for fisher markets
A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization
...
1
2
3
...