Market representations of $n$-person games

@article{Billera1974MarketRO,
  title={Market representations of \$n\$-person games},
  author={Louis J. Billera and Robert E. Bixby},
  journal={Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society},
  year={1974},
  volume={80},
  pages={522-526}
}
  • L. BilleraR. Bixby
  • Published 1 May 1974
  • Economics
  • Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society

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