Corpus ID: 38885203

Market Failures and Public Policy

@inproceedings{Cournot2015MarketFA,
  title={Market Failures and Public Policy},
  author={Antoine Augustin Cournot and Jules Dupuit},
  year={2015}
}
Economists have long extolled the virtues of markets. Unfettered competition protects consumers from the political influence of lobbies, and forces producers to deliver products and services at cost. Alas, competition is rarely perfect, markets fail, and market power—the firms’ ability to raise price substantially above cost or to offer low quality—must be kept in check. Industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power. To this purpose, it builds models that capture the… Expand

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MARKET POWER AND INEQUALITY: THE REVENGE OF THE RENTIERS
  • 2017
some systemic shifts in power relations between core economic actors in the nonnancial corporate sector t is base on the n erstan in that instit tions matter a lot The Economist an that rebalancinExpand
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