Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value *

@inproceedings{Clippel2005MarginalCA,
  title={Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value *},
  author={Geoffroy de Clippel and Roberto Serrano},
  year={2005}
}
Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value leads to the identification of bounds on players’ payoffs around an “externality-free” value. The approach determines the direction and maximum size of Pigouvian-like transfers among players, transfers based on the specific nature of externalities that are compatible with basic normative principles. Examples are provided to illustrate the… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.

Citations

Publications citing this paper.

Sharing a river among satiable agents

Games and Economic Behavior • 2008
View 6 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 20 references

A Value for n-Person Games,” in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, A

L. S. Shapley
1953
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities,” Presidential Address to the Econometric Society, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

E. Maskin
2003
View 3 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

On the Marginality Principle in Partition Function Form Games,

Y. Fujinaka
Mimeo, Graduate School of Economics, • 2004
View 1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…