Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge

  title={Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge},
  author={J{\'e}r{\^o}me Dokic and Paul {\'E}gr{\'e}},
In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them… 

Margins for error in context

According to the epistemic theory of vagueness defended in particular by Sorensen (2001) and Williamson (1994: 237), vagueness is due to our limited powers of discrimination: looking at a particular

The Margin-for-Error Principle Revised

Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument purports to show that principle KK is incompatible with a plausible Margin-for-Error requirement for inexact knowledge. In this paper I advocate an alternative

Reliability, Margin for Error and Self-Knowledge

An attempt to refine and systematize the modal analysis of the reliability of knowledge given by Williamson, and to delimit the scope of margin for error principles.

Self-knowledge and the KK principle

I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a

Practical Knowledge and Luminosity

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed

Transparency and the KK Principle

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A Note on Safety and Iterated Knowledge

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Feelings of (Un)Certainty and Margins for Error

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A dynamic analysis of the process whereby a subject reflects on the reliability conditions of her perceptual knowledge is proposed and a precise characterization of the demarcation between paradoxical and non-paradoxical scenarios in terms of the properties of sequences of estimates is provided.

(Un)knowability and knowledge iteration

The KK principle states that knowing entails knowing that one knows. This historically popular principle has fallen out of favour among many contemporary philosophers in light of putative



Margins for error in context

According to the epistemic theory of vagueness defended in particular by Sorensen (2001) and Williamson (1994: 237), vagueness is due to our limited powers of discrimination: looking at a particular

Two Problems for an Epistemicist View of Vagueness

An epistemicist view about vagueness is any view that includes at least the conjunction of two theses, one thesis that we might call (semantic) optimism, that does not involve the concept of

A non-standard Semantics for Inexact Knowledge with Introspection

Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be

On Knowledge and Belief

Identity and Discrimination.

Concepts of indiscriminability logics of indiscriminability paradoxes of indiscriminability concepts of phenomenal character logics of phenomenal character logics of phenomenal character paradoxes of

Knowledge and its Limits

Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford, Oxford University Press

  • 2000

Intensional logics without interative axioms

It may be that there is no way to axiomatize an intensional logic without recourse to one or more iterative axioms; then I call that logic iterative. But many familiar logics can be axiomatized by

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1. Transparent Propositions and Margin for Error Semantics Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is