on abstraction per se. If he were depicting abstraction with regard to PSS, he would define it as the deployment of a simulator that re-enacts an abundance of experiential forms. (Barsalou 1999, p. 642) (iv) Finally, let me present an objection that is written large in a serious misunderstanding of embodied simulation. The fact that you experience hearing a sentence you understand differently from hearing a foreign one you do not understand, though the imagery (auralizing each sentence) is nearly identical in both cases, suggests that the experiential difference cannot be explained in terms of imagery. What if one realizes that the multimodal reenactments of feature maps – that is, imagery – differs decisively from one another? It seems obvious that this objection is motivated by wrongly considering imagery as nothing more than hearing, speaking or seeing meaningless linguistic tokens, like the misapprehension of imagery in terms of static pictures that have to be read by a central processor to generate content at all. As we have seen, according to Pulvermüller's theory of language, the phenomenal difference amounts to drawing on sensorimotor contents stored in memory in the case of understanding, as distinct from hearing a foreign sentence. If you like, processing word forms and processing content bearing sensorimotor simulations as a package constitutes mental imagery.