Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods

  title={Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods},
  author={Nozomu Muto and Yasuhiro Shirata},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
We study manipulation via endowments in a market in an auction setting with multiple goods. In the market, there are buyers whose valuations are their private information, and a seller whose set of endowments is her private information. A social planner, who wants to implement a socially desirable allocation, faces the seller’s manipulation via endowments, in addition to buyers’ manipulation of misreporting their valuations.We call amechanism immune to the seller’smanipulation via endowments… CONTINUE READING


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