• DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2809566
Corpus ID: 53645899

Manipulability in Constrained School Choice

@article{Decerf2016ManipulabilityIC,
  title={Manipulability in Constrained School Choice},
  author={Benoit Decerf and Martin van der Linden},
  journal={Political Economy - Development: Public Service Delivery eJournal},
  year={2016}
}

Benoit Decerf, Martin van der Linden

Published 2016

Computer Science

Political Economy - Development: Public Service Delivery eJournal

In constrained school choice mechanisms, students can only rank a subset of the schools they could potentially access. We characterize dominant and undominated strategies in the constrained Boston (BOS) and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms. Using our characterization of dominant strategies we show that in constrained DA, the single tie-breaking rule outperforms the multiple tie-breaking rule in terms of both manipulability and stability. We also show that DA is less manipulable than… CONTINUE READING

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