Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control

  title={Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control},
  author={Anastasios Xepapadeas},
  journal={Environmental and Resource Economics},
  • A. Xepapadeas
  • Published 1 June 1995
  • Economics
  • Environmental and Resource Economics
The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition… 
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