Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans

  title={Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans},
  author={A. Almaz{\'a}n and J. Su{\'a}rez},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  • A. Almazán, J. Suárez
  • Published 2000
  • Business
  • CEPR Discussion Paper Series
  • This Paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analysed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private benefits, which can be restricted by the monitor, and is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within this setting, we find that managers will submit to monitoring when they receive favourable private information. This result is consistent with event study evidence that suggests that the market has a… CONTINUE READING
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