Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis

@article{Morck1988ManagementOA,
  title={Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis},
  author={R. Morck and A. Shleifer and R. Vishny},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  year={1988},
  volume={20},
  pages={293-315}
}
  • R. Morck, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny
  • Published 1988
  • Business
  • Journal of Financial Economics
    • We investigate the relation between management ownership and corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a cross-section of Fortune 500 firms, Tobin's Q first increases and then declines as board of directors holdings rise. For older firms there is weak evidence that Q is lower when a firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder. 
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