Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction

@article{Saxe2005MakingSO,
  title={Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction},
  author={Rebecca Saxe and Anna Wexler},
  journal={Neuropsychologia},
  year={2005},
  volume={43},
  pages={1391-1399}
}

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