Corpus ID: 210942976

Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation

@article{Cimpeanu2020MakingAE,
  title={Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation},
  author={Theodor Cimpeanu and Han The Anh},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2020},
  volume={abs/2001.08245}
}
  • Theodor Cimpeanu, Han The Anh
  • Published in ArXiv 2020
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Social punishment has been suggested as a key approach to ensuring high levels of cooperation and norm compliance in one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interactions. However, it has been shown that it only works when punishment is highly cost-efficient. On the other hand, signalling retribution hearkens back to medieval sovereignty, insofar as the very word for gallows in French stems from the Latin word for power and serves as a grim symbol of the ruthlessness of high justice. Here we introduce the… CONTINUE READING

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