Majority rule and allocation

  title={Majority rule and allocation},
  author={Benjamin N. Ward},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={379 - 389}
  • B. Ward
  • Published 1 December 1961
  • Economics
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
Majority rule is, generally speaking, not an optimal decision-making process. Important among its advantages is the element of participation. Everyone who wishes votes and in close situations the switching of a single vote may reverse the outcome. Also the winning proposal (if there is one) has the advantage that shifting from it to another alternative will cause dissatisfaction among more people than it will please. On the other hand, majority rule suffers from lack of consideration of… 

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