Majority is not enough

@article{Eyal2018MajorityIN,
  title={Majority is not enough},
  author={Ittay Eyal and E. Sirer},
  journal={Communications of the ACM},
  year={2018},
  volume={61},
  pages={95 - 102}
}
The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a public log called the blockchain. [...] Key Method It prohibits selfish mining by a coalition that command less than 1/4 of the resources. This threshold is lower than the wrongly assumed 1/2 bound, but better than the current reality where a coalition of any size can compromise the system.Expand
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