Main trends in recent philosophy: two dogmas of empiricism.

W. Quine

DOI:10.2307/2181906

Corpus ID: 170690019

Main trends in recent philosophy: two dogmas of empiricism.

@article{Quine1951MainTI,
  title={Main trends in recent philosophy: two dogmas of empiricism.},
  author={W. Quine},
  journal={The Philosophical Review},
  year={1951},
  volume={60},
  pages={20}
}

W. Quine
Published 1951
Psychology
The Philosophical Review

M ODERN empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is… Expand

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