Mafia: A theoretical study of players and coalitions in a partial information environment

@article{Braverman2008MafiaAT,
  title={Mafia: A theoretical study of players and coalitions in a partial information environment},
  author={Mark Braverman and Omid Etesami and Elchanan Mossel},
  journal={Annals of Applied Probability},
  year={2008},
  volume={18},
  pages={825-846}
}
In this paper, we study a game called “Mafia,” in which different players have different types of information, communication and functionality. The players communicate and function in a way that resembles some real-life situations. We consider two types of operations. First, there are operations that follow an open democratic discussion. Second, some subgroups of players who may have different interests make decisions based on their own group interest. A key ingredient here is that the identity… Expand

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  • DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO TORONTO, ONTARIO CANADA M59 3G4 E-MAIL: mbraverm@cs.toronto.edu O. ETESAMI DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY BERKELEY,
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