MPC-Friendly Commitments for Publicly Verifiable Covert Security

  title={MPC-Friendly Commitments for Publicly Verifiable Covert Security},
  author={Nitin Agrawal and James Bell and Adria Gasc'on and Matt J. Kusner},
  journal={Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  • Nitin AgrawalJames Bell Matt J. Kusner
  • Published 15 September 2021
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
We address the problem of efficiently verifying a commitment in a two-party computation. This addresses the scenario where a party P1 commits to a value x to be used in a subsequent secure computation with another party P2 that wants to receive assurance that P1 did not cheat, i.e. that x was indeed the value inputted into the secure computation. Our constructions operate in the publicly verifiable covert (PVC) security model, which is a relaxation of the malicious model of MPC, appropriate in… 



Efficiently Enforcing Input Validity in Secure Two-party Computation

A protocol in which only the underlying function is garbled ρ times, and the predicate checks are each garbled only once is shown, which can lead to huge savings in communication and computation.

Global-Scale Secure Multiparty Computation

This work designs an efficient preprocessing phase that allows the parties to generate authenticated information; it shows how to use this information to distributively construct a single "authenticated" garbled circuit that is evaluated by one party.

Fast Cut-and-Choose-Based Protocols for Malicious and Covert Adversaries

A cut-and-choose protocol for secure computation based on garbled circuits, with security in the presence of malicious adversaries, that vastly improves on all previous protocols of this type and relies on the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption.

Calling out Cheaters: Covert Security With Public Verifiability

This work proposes (and formally define) an extension of the model where, when an honest party detects cheating, it also receives a certificate that can be published and used to persuade other parties, without revealing any information about the honest party's input.

On Garbling Schemes with and Without Privacy

This work shows that, for a certain class of circuits, one can reduce this overhead for two-party function evaluation with security against cheating parties SFE, and additionally shows how to integrate this solution with the SFE protocol of [5], thus reducing the overhead even further.

More efficient oblivious transfer and extensions for faster secure computation

This work proposes a novel OT protocol with security in the standard model and improves OT extensions with respect to communication complexity, computation complexity, and scalability and demonstrates the importance of correctly implementing OT within secure computation protocols by presenting an attack on the FastGC framework.

Universally Composable Commitments

We propose a new security measure for commitment protocols, called Universally Composable (UC) Commitment. The measure guarantees that commitment protocols behave like an "ideal commitment service,"…

Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)

  • Yehuda Lindell
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
    IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
  • 2020
What MPC is, what problems it solves, and how it is being currently used are reviewed, and many highly relevant works are not cited.

Security Against Covert Adversaries: Efficient Protocols for Realistic Adversaries

The notion of covert adversaries is introduced, which is believed to faithfully models the adversarial behavior in many commercial, political, and social settings and it is shown that it is possible to obtain highly efficient protocols that are secure against such adversaries.

Authenticated Garbling and Efficient Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation

The work shows that the performance penalty for maliciously secure two-party computation (as compared to semi-honest security) is much smaller than previously believed.