MLSNet: A Policy Complying Multilevel Security Framework for Software Defined Networking

@article{Achleitner2021MLSNetAP,
  title={MLSNet: A Policy Complying Multilevel Security Framework for Software Defined Networking},
  author={Stefan Achleitner and Quinn K. Burke and Patrick Mcdaniel and Trent Jaeger and Thomas F. La Porta and Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy},
  journal={IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management},
  year={2021},
  volume={18},
  pages={729-744}
}
Ensuring that information flowing through a network is secure from manipulation and eavesdropping by unauthorized parties is an important task for network administrators. Many cyber attacks rely on a lack of network-level information flow controls to successfully compromise a victim network. Once an adversary exploits an initial entry point, they can eavesdrop and move laterally within the network (e.g., scan and penetrate internal nodes) to further their malicious goals. In this article, we… 

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