author={Robert Eamon Briscoe},
  journal={Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  • R. Briscoe
  • Published 1 June 2011
  • Philosophy
  • Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only… 

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