MCDM Application of the Third Vote

@article{Tangian2021MCDMAO,
  title={MCDM Application of the Third Vote},
  author={Andranik Tangian},
  journal={Group Decision and Negotiation},
  year={2021},
  volume={30},
  pages={775-787}
}
  • A. Tangian
  • Published 28 April 2021
  • Education
  • Group Decision and Negotiation
When choosing among alternatives, group members may have various preferences regarding the properties of a solution being sought. Since the properties partially do and partially do not meet their collective wishes, the alternatives are in fact better or worse representatives of the collective will. This idea is implemented in the so-called Third Vote election method aimed at enhancing policy representation, and we show how to use it for collective multi-criteria decision making. To be specific… 
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