author={Joseph Levine},
  journal={Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  • J. Levine
  • Published 1 October 1983
  • Philosophy
  • Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
J n “Naming and Necessity”1 and “Identity and Necessity,”2 Kripke presents a version of the Cartesian argument against mate­ rialism. His argument involves two central claims: first, that all identity state­ ments using rigid designators on both sides of the identity sign are, if true at all, true in all possible worlds where the terms refer; second, that psycho-physical identity statements are conceivably false, and therefore, by the first claim, actually false. My purpose in this paper is to… 

The Knowledge Argument

Frank Jackson first presented the Knowledge Argument (henceforth KA) in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982). The KA is an argument against physicalism, the doctrine that (very roughly put) everything is

Type‐Identity Statements and the Explanatory Gap: An Argument for Compatibility

This paper challenges a popular thesis which we call the explanatory primitiveness thesis (for short, EPT), namely, the thesis that identities leave no logical space wherein explanatory questions may

Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible

Do Conceivability Arguments against Physicalism Beg the Question?

Many well-known arguments against physicalism—e.g., Chalmers’s Zombie Argument and Kripke’s Modal Argument—contend that it is conceivable for there to be physical duplicates of ourselves that have no

Constitution and the explanatory gap

The thesis of this paper is that the EG does not disappear when the authors substitute constitution for identity, and four arguments for the EG are examined, showing that none of them is undermined by the move from constitution to identity.

Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model

How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of

Qualia and Introspection

The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation


  • Gary Ebbs
  • Philosophy, Psychology
    A Theory of Truthmaking
  • 2019
This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic/synthetic distinction: In his classic early writings on analyticity in particular, in “Truth by convention” “Two dogmas of empiricism”

Modal rationalism and the demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument against physicalism

A novel demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument, according to which demonstratives play a vital role in the generation of meaning for the authors' representations of conscious experience and is the source of the epistemic gap between consciousness and the physical.

Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds

A slew of conceivability arguments have been given against physicalism. Many physicalists try to undermine these arguments by offering accounts of phenomenal concepts that explain how there can be an


3My argument in this paper is influenced by Thomas Nagel's in his paper "What Is It Like To Be a Bat?

  • reprinted in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds
  • 1972