• Corpus ID: 15552127

MAPS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: A PERSPECTIVE ON INTUITIVE JUDGMENT AND CHOICE

@inproceedings{Kahneman2003MAPSOB,
  title={MAPS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: A PERSPECTIVE ON INTUITIVE JUDGMENT AND CHOICE},
  author={Daniel Kahneman},
  year={2003}
}
The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky (1937‐1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded rationality. This essay presents a current perspective on the three major topics of our joint work: heuristics of judgment, risky choice, and framing effects. In all three domains we studied intuitions ‐ thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and… 

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