Lucas against Mechanism

@article{Lewis1969LucasAM,
  title={Lucas against Mechanism},
  author={David Lewis},
  journal={Philosophy},
  year={1969},
  volume={44},
  pages={231 - 233}
}
  • D. Lewis
  • Published 1 July 1969
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy
J. R. Lucas argues in “Minds, Machines, and Gödel”, that his potential output of truths of arithmetic cannot be duplicated by any Turing machine, and a fortiori cannot be duplicated by any machine. Given any Turing machine that generates a sequence of truths of arithmetic, Lucas can produce as true some sentence of arithmetic that the machine will never generate. Therefore Lucas is no machine. 

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Why we shouldn't fault Lucas and Penrose for continuing to believe in the Goedelian argument against computationalism

The only fault we can fairly lay at Lucas' and Penrose's doors, for continuing to believe in the essential soundness of the Goedelian argument, is their naive faith in, first, non-verifiable

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References

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Minds, Machines and Gödel

Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I

Transfinite Recursive Progressions of Axiomatic Theories

The theories considered here are based on the classical functional calculus (possibly of higher order) together with a set A of non-logical axioms; they are also assumed to contain classical