Loyalty and Acquiescence: Authoritarian Regimes and Inequality Outcomes

@article{Hanson2013LoyaltyAA,
  title={Loyalty and Acquiescence: Authoritarian Regimes and Inequality Outcomes},
  author={Jonathan K. Hanson},
  journal={ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)},
  year={2013}
}
  • Jonathan K. Hanson
  • Published 1 August 2013
  • Political Science, Economics
  • ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)
This article seeks to explain inequality outcomes in authoritarian regimes as a function of the different combinations of loyalty-building and repressive measures (carrots and sticks) that authoritarian rulers use to maintain power. Like democratically-elected rulers, authoritarian rulers supply public and private goods in response to competitive pressures, and they can also employ repression to raise the costs of political dissent. The optimal combination of carrots and sticks varies across… 

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