Loyalty and Acquiescence: Authoritarian Regimes and Inequality Outcomes

@article{Hanson2013LoyaltyAA,
  title={Loyalty and Acquiescence: Authoritarian Regimes and Inequality Outcomes},
  author={Jonathan K. Hanson},
  journal={Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal},
  year={2013}
}
  • Jonathan K. Hanson
  • Published 2013
  • Economics
  • Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal
This article seeks to explain inequality outcomes in authoritarian regimes as a function of the different combinations of loyalty-building and repressive measures (carrots and sticks) that authoritarian rulers use to maintain power. Like democratically-elected rulers, authoritarian rulers supply public and private goods in response to competitive pressures, and they can also employ repression to raise the costs of political dissent. The optimal combination of carrots and sticks varies across… Expand
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