Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games

@inproceedings{Goldberg2021LowerBF,
  title={Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games},
  author={Paul W. Goldberg and Matthew J. Katzman},
  booktitle={SAGT},
  year={2021}
}
Nearly a decade ago, Azrieli and Shmaya introduced the class of λ-Lipschitz games in which every player’s payoff function is λ-Lipschitz with respect to the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit -approximate pure Nash equilibria for certain settings of and λ. They left open, however, the question of how hard it is to find such an equilibrium. In this work, we develop a query-efficient reduction from more general games to Lipschitz games. We use this reduction to show a… 

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