• Corpus ID: 231801944

Low-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders

  title={Low-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders},
  author={Michael Neuder and Daniel J. Moroz and Rithvik Rao and David C. Parkes},
We outline two dishonest strategies that can be cheaply executed on the Ethereum 2.0 beacon chain, even by validators holding less than one-third of the total stake: malicious chain reorganizations (“reorgs”) and finality delays. In a malicious reorg, an attacker withholds their blocks and attestations before releasing them at an opportune time in order to force a chain reorganization, which they can take advantage of by double-spending or front-running transactions. To execute a finality delay… 

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