Loss Coverage as a Public Policy Objective for Risk Classification Schemes

@article{Thomas2008LossCA,
  title={Loss Coverage as a Public Policy Objective for Risk Classification Schemes},
  author={R. G. Thomas},
  journal={Labor: Public Policy \& Regulation},
  year={2008}
}
  • R. G. Thomas
  • Published 2008
  • Economics
  • Labor: Public Policy & Regulation
This article suggests that from a public policy perspective, some degree of adverse selection may be desirable in some insurance markets. The article suggests that a public policymaker should consider the criterion of “loss coverage,” and that in some markets a policymaker may wish to regulate risk classification with a view to increasing loss coverage. Either too much or too little risk classification may reduce loss coverage. The concept is explored by means of examples and formulaic and… Expand
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