Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts

@article{Floridi2008LogicalFA,
  title={Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts},
  author={L. Floridi},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2008},
  volume={167},
  pages={317-325}
}
  • L. Floridi
  • Published 1 March 2009
  • Computer Science
  • Synthese
The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes’ theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer… Expand

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