Logical Predictivism

  title={Logical Predictivism},
  author={Ben Martin and Ole Thomassen Hjortland},
  journal={J. Philos. Log.},
Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a… 

Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic and the Burden of Explanation

  • B. Martin
  • Philosophy
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy
  • 2021
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: Drawing on the epistemology of logic literature on anti-exceptionalism about logic, we set out to investigate the following metaphilosophical questions empirically: Is philosophy special? Are its



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Language, Truth and Logic

  • T. G.
  • Philosophy
  • 1936
AbstractTHIS excellent compendium of the views and doctrines of the new positivism derived from the scientific empiricism of the Vienna circle and an extreme interpretation of the aims of logic, will

Anti-exceptionalism about logic

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A according to a widely shared view of science, scientific theories predict and explain facts about "observables": objects and properties which can be perceived by the senses, sometimes augmented by

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