Logical Non-Cognitivism

  title={Logical Non-Cognitivism},
  author={C. Wright},
  journal={Philosophical Issues},
  • C. Wright
  • Published 2018
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Issues
Logic and Human Practices
What, outside of our logical theories, makes us believe that the theories are reliable, and what is it that warrants them? What I propose is that it is just our argumentative practices; that logic isExpand
Foot Without Achilles’ Heel
It is often assumed that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics postulates an obligation to be a good human being and that it derives further obligations from this idea. The paper argues that this assumptionExpand
Logical Expressivism and Carroll's Regress
  • C. Besson
  • Philosophy
  • Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
  • 2019
Abstract In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towardsExpand


The intellectual given
Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditionalExpand
Comment on Paul Boghossian, “What is inference”
This is a response to Paul Boghossian’s paper: What is inference? (doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9903-x). The paper and the abstract originate from a symposium at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA inExpand
Comments on Boghossian
Broome thinks Paul Boghossian's expression taking something to be a reason takes Boghossian further than he would want to go. It implies that normative thoughts are necessary for reasoning. It isExpand
What is inference?
Boghossian offers his thoughts on what constitutes inference in philosophy. He believes that no Dispositional account of rule-following can hope to succeed. However, even without arguing against aExpand
Knowledge of Validity
What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committedExpand
Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws
The essay addresses the well-known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non-inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge ofExpand
I—Crispin Wright: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?
My life consists in my being content to accept many things (Wittgenstein On Certainty x344) Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, thatExpand
I—Paul Boghossian
The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts ofExpand
On Basic Logical Knowledge; Reflections on Paul Boghossian's "How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?''
§1. Frege wrote that "There is nothing more objective than the laws of arithmetic".2 Acceptance of the objectivity of logic, mathematics, and of epistemic norms generally—norms determining whenExpand