Logarithmic Query Complexity for Approximate Nash Computation in Large Games

  title={Logarithmic Query Complexity for Approximate Nash Computation in Large Games},
  author={Paul W. Goldberg and Francisco Javier Marmolejo-Coss{\'i}o and Zhiwei Steven Wu},
  journal={Theory of Computing Systems},
We investigate the problem of equilibrium computation for “large” n-player games. Large games have a Lipschitz-type property that no single player’s utility is greatly affected by any other individual player’s actions. In this paper, we mostly focus on the case where any change of strategy by a player causes other players’ payoffs to change by at most 1n$\frac {1}{n}$. We study algorithms having query access to the game’s payoff function, aiming to find ε-Nash equilibria. We seek algorithms… 
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