Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff

@article{Kroszner1996LogRollingAE,
  title={Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff},
  author={Randall S. Kroszner and Douglas A. Irwin},
  journal={Economic History},
  year={1996}
}

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