Location Equilibrium for Cournot Oligopoly in Spatially Separated Markets

@inproceedings{Sarkar1997LocationEF,
  title={Location Equilibrium for Cournot Oligopoly in Spatially Separated Markets},
  author={Jyotirmoy Sarkar and Barnali Gupta and Debashis Pal},
  year={1997}
}
Consider a two-stage non-cooperative Cournot game with location choice involving n≥ 2 firms each with several facilities. There are m≥ 2 spatially separated markets constituting the vertices of a network. Each firm first selects the locations of their facilities and then selects the quantities to supply to the markets to maximize its profit. There exists a Nash equilibrium in the quantities offered by each firm at the markets. Furthermore, when the demand in each market is sufficiently large… CONTINUE READING

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