Local Spillovers , Convexity and the Strategic Substitutes Property in Networks

@inproceedings{Billand2011LocalS,
  title={Local Spillovers , Convexity and the Strategic Substitutes Property in Networks},
  author={Pascal Billand and Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi},
  year={2011}
}
We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of these networks. JEL Classification: C70, D85 

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