Local Public Procurement Regulations: The Case of Italy

@article{Decarolis2015LocalPP,
  title={Local Public Procurement Regulations: The Case of Italy},
  author={Francesco Decarolis and Cristina Giorgiantonio},
  journal={PSN: Public Administration (Development) (Topic)},
  year={2015}
}
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