Local Favoritism in At-large Proportional Representation Systems

  title={Local Favoritism in At-large Proportional Representation Systems},
  author={Jon H. Fiva and Askill H. Halse},
Pork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts. Such behavior is expected to depend on the incentives imposed by the electoral system. We estimate the causal effect of local representation in a closed list proportional representation system where individual candidates have no clear electoral incentive to favor their hometown. Using data from Norwegian regional governments, we… CONTINUE READING


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