Local Amenities and Rents: Tiebout Takes a Vacation

  title={Local Amenities and Rents: Tiebout Takes a Vacation},
  author={Nathan B. Anderson},
  journal={Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Regional Science},
This paper considers a two-community model with free mobility, public expenditures set by majority voting, amenities that differ across communities, and two types of taxpayers sorting across communities according to different preferences. Residents pay local taxes, consume public services, and have the right to vote. Vacationers cannot vote, yet pay local taxes, and consume amenities. Amenities attract vacationers whose tax payments produce rents reducing the costs of public spending for… Expand
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