• Corpus ID: 3131335

# Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control

@article{Faliszewski2008LlullAC,
title={Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control},
author={Piotr Faliszewski and Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and J{\"o}rg Rothe},
journal={ArXiv},
year={2008},
volume={abs/0809.4484}
}
• Published 25 September 2008
• Mathematics
• ArXiv
The only systems previously known to be resistant to all the standard control types were highly artificial election systems created by hybridization. We study a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland^\alpha, where the parameter \alpha is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates. We prove that Copeland^{0.5}, the system commonly referred to as "Copeland voting," provides full resistance to constructive…

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