Corpus ID: 210114437

Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweizer’s Open Club Model with Semi-Public Goods∗

@inproceedings{Raa2003LindahlEA,
  title={Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweizer’s Open Club Model with Semi-Public Goods∗},
  author={M. Raa},
  year={2003}
}
Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer’s concept of club efficiency under a variable number of economic agents. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that… Expand

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