Limited Liability and the Known Unknown

  title={Limited Liability and the Known Unknown},
  author={Michael N Simkovic},
  journal={International Corporate Finance eJournal},
  • M. Simkovic
  • Published 27 February 2018
  • Business
  • International Corporate Finance eJournal
Private firms often withhold information or contest scientific knowledge when public revelation could lead to costly regulations or liability. This concealment leads to negative externalities and public harm. But what if private firms’ superior knowledge and self-interest could be harnessed to reveal information about risks and accelerate the implementation of safety regulations? In Limited Liability and the Known Unknown, I argue that firms that desire limited liability for their investors… Expand
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