Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection

@article{Moore2021LibertarianFW,
  title={Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection},
  author={Dwayne Moore},
  journal={Philosophia},
  year={2021},
  volume={50},
  pages={159-182}
}
Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents (or, agent-involving events) cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or not: Maddy’s… 
3 Citations

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 102 REFERENCES

Review of John Lemos’ A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will

  • R. Double
  • Philosophy
    Criminal Law and Philosophy
  • 2020
Libertarians in the free will problem assert that persons act freely and are morally responsible when they exercise undetermined free choices, choices that could have been different than they were

Can Self-Forming Actions Dispel Worries about Luck?

Libertarian theories of freedom and responsibility face a worry about luck: if an action is undetermined, the action cannot be legitimately attributed to the agent; instead the action is a matter of

Kane, Balaguer, Libertarianism, and Luck

In his event-causal libertarian theory of free will, Robert Kane maintains that in the moments leading up to an undetermined free choice the agent engages in competing efforts of will and he regards

Cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists as well

Alfred Mele has put forward what he regards as “a serious problem luck poses for libertarians” ([Mele, Alfred. 2006. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press.], 6): that the kind of

Cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists as well

Alfred Mele has put forward what he regards as “a serious problem luck poses for libertarians” ([Mele, Alfred. 2006. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press.], 6): that the kind of

Lucky agents, big and little: should size really matter?

This essay critically examines Alfred R. Mele’s attempt to solve a problem for libertarianism that he calls the problem of present luck. Many have thought that the traditional libertarian belief in

On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will

In a recent paper in this journal, “How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?” Christopher Evan Franklin critically examines my libertarian view of free will and

Indeterminist Free Will

The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the

Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument

Among challenges to libertarians, the Mind Argument has loomed large. Believing that this challenge cannot be met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will is a mystery. Recently,

Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem

In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal
...