Let’s Pretend!

@article{Tollefsen2005LetsP,
  title={Let’s Pretend!},
  author={D. Tollefsen},
  journal={Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
  year={2005},
  volume={35},
  pages={75 - 97}
}
  • D. Tollefsen
  • Published 2005
  • Sociology
  • Philosophy of the Social Sciences
  • According to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of… CONTINUE READING
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